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ABSTRACT Diverse and non-coherent sets of epistemological principles current-
ly inform research in the general area of functional genomics. Here, from the personal 
point of view of a scientist with over half a century of immersion in hypothesis driven 
scientific discovery, I compare and deconstruct the ideological bases of prominent re-
cent alternatives, such as “discovery science,” some productions of the ENCODE proj-
ect, and aspects of large data set systems biology. The outputs of these types of scientific 
enterprise qualitatively reflect their radical definitions of scientific knowledge, and of 
its logical requirements. Their properties emerge in high relief when contrasted (as an 
example) to a recent, system-wide, predictive analysis of a developmental regulatory 
apparatus that was instead based directly on hypothesis-driven experimental tests of 
mechanism.
Explanation in Developmental Biology
In my field, animal developmental biology, and in what could be regarded as its “deep time derivative,” the evolutionary biology of the animal body plan, there 
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exist two kinds of experimentally supported causal explanation. These can be de-
scribed as “rooted” and “unrooted.” Rooted causal explanation provides logical 
links to and from the genomic regulatory code, extending right into the genomic 
sequences that control regulatory gene expression. The genomic regulatory code 
ultimately determines the developmental process in a direct way, since subsequent 
developmental events all depend directly and specifically on what regulatory genes 
are being expressed and where in the developing organism they are being expressed 
(Peter and Davidson 2015). Here the term “regulatory genes” strictly denotes genes 
encoding the transcription factors that control each phase of developmental func-
tion by specifically mediating the expression or repression of genes. Transcription 
factors have the unique ability to read DNA regulatory sequence and so to specify 
the parts of the genetic apparatus to be deployed. (RNAs can also read DNA se-
quence, but turn out to play relatively minor roles in development.)
By unrooted explanations, I mean those in which the only causality is to be 
located within a process considered, for example within a synthesis pathway 
(without reference to why the enzymes are expressed where they are in the first 
place), or within a signaling event (without reference to why the signal is expressed 
in the sending cells, or what it does to gene activation in the receiving cells). The 
tangent to the curve presently describing publication of results in developmental 
biology would show that most newly generated literature in this field is oriented 
toward unrooted explanations (if there is any explanatory causality included at 
all). Nonetheless, it can be predicted that research programs confined to unrooted 
explanation of developmental processes are going to become endangered species. 
Unrooted research will inevitably become extinct, or be relegated to boutique 
applications, by the comparatively enormous explanatory power of rooted 
explanation. The prediction is therefore that for any scientific contributions in basic 
science aimed at mechanistic conceptual understanding, an increasingly stringent 
requirement will be explanation rooted directly in genomic regulatory sequence. 
As we see later in this essay, the evidence is already in that such explanations 
are experimentally accessible, and that they fit the bill in the sense of conveying 
intellectually satisfying chains of causality extending from genome to the observed 
processes of development.
Throughout my own career in bioscience, I have exploited the explanatory 
effectiveness of hypothesis-driven scientific logic to explore how animals attain their 
properties, i.e., express their genomes and develop. Now, new winds are blowing in 
the realm of scientific inquiry, as they are throughout our intellectual culture. It has 
been for me thrilling to have participated in the discovery, just over the last decade, 
that when applied to basic science, the new precepts of systems biology generate 
a lift that propels science into rooted causal explanation. But other winds blow in 
contrary directions, challenging some of the intrinsic epistemological aspects of 
experimental scientific inquiry as they have richly developed over the last 400 years, 
and most relevantly for us in the last half of the 20th century, when experimental 
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molecular biology rose to dominance. Alternative approaches to answering 
these same questions about genome function are on offer, bolstered by powerful 
institutional support. In the first parts of this essay I have sought to deconstruct 
some of the diverse precepts of doing science that now populate current literature, 
in order to reflect on the nature of the functional genomics to which these different 
scientific practices give rise. There then follows, by contrast, an illustration of the 
breadth and depth of the resolving power of the new precepts of systems biology, 
when synthesized with the old precepts of “traditional” scientific logic. Recently 
Isabelle Peter and I have (2015) shown that it is possible to encompass regulatory, 
developmental, and evolutionary biology in the single conceptual framework of 
rooted explanation based on this synthesis.
Genomics
The Prejudice Against Explanation as the Objective of Scientific Research
One might think that in that branch of biology the explicit aim of which is to 
understand what the genome means and what it does, exemplary relations between 
explanation, causality, and observation might already prevail. Modern genomics 
began as an enormous and enormously successful effort to obtain DNA sequence 
on an organism-wide scale and to create accessible databases thereof, an effort that 
has most certainly and most irreversibly transformed biology. But unfortunately, as 
the larger genomics enterprises, mainly government agencies, have expanded their 
brief to include research into how the genome works and what it means, we see the 
objectives of making databases being mistaken for the objectives of doing science. 
The scientific products of this effort are so far devoid of rooted explanations of 
mechanism, or unrooted explanations of mechanism, and indeed are not actually 
aimed at any explanations at all. The purview of “institutional” functional genomics 
of this genre is best summarized in its own words, the objectives overview of the 
ENCODE project:
The ENCODE (Encyclopedia of DNA Elements) Consortium is an interna-
tional collaboration of research groups funded by the National Human Genome 
Research Institute (NHGRI). The goal of ENCODE is to build a comprehen-
sive parts list of functional elements in the human genome, including elements 
that act at the protein and RNA levels, and regulatory elements that control cells 
and circumstances in which a gene is active. . . . ENCODE investigators employ 
a variety of assays and methods to identify functional elements. The discovery 
and annotation of gene elements is accomplished primarily by sequencing a 
diverse range of RNA sources, comparative genomics, integrative bioinformatic 
methods, and human curation. Regulatory elements are typically investigated 
through DNA hypersensitivity assays, assays of DNA methylation, and immuno-
precipitation (IP) of proteins that interact with DNA and RNA, i.e., modified 
histones, transcription factors, chromatin regulators, and RNA-binding proteins, 
followed by sequencing. (ENCODE 2015)
Eric H. Davidson Genomics
168 Perspectives in Biology and Medicine
Parts List sans Predictability
It is indeed essential to have a parts list. But note that the list of approved 
approaches excludes any perturbations, such as changing a sequence experimentally 
to test a functional prediction, or test of regulatory activity by insertion of synthetic 
expression constructs, which is of course how everything functional that we have 
learned about animal gene regulation over the last 40 years has been discovered 
(Peter and Davidson 2015). The methods, attitudes, significance, and interpretation 
of ENCODE as a scientific enterprise, and as an actual scientific guide to how the 
genome works, have become controversial and are recently the subject of critical 
discourse (Doolittle 2013; Eddy 2013; Graur and Zheng 2015; Graur et al. 2011; 
Kellis et al. 2014; Niu and Jiang 2013), though almost universally the databases 
generated by the ENCODE consortia are regarded as useful. The general and 
deep controversies surrounding ENCODE, however, are aside from the fish I have 
in mind to fry in this commentary. What I am interested in here is the curious 
epistemological consequences to which the ENCODE enterprise has given rise: 
witness the following example from a paper entitled “Identification of Functional 
Elements and Regulatory Circuits by Drosophila modENCODE” (2010). 
Figure 7 of this paper presents an enormous predicted gene regulatory network 
(GRN) for Drosophila development. This “physical” GRN is based on chromatin 
immunoprecipitation data (ChIP) data obtained with 76 transcription factors for 
which antibodies were available, in which linkages to about 12,500 target genes 
were logged, and on computational analysis of conserved “promoter” target site 
motifs. The paper includes an extensive account of the data acquisition and data 
reduction procedures underlying the “physical” GRN, and the statistics of the results 
upon which this GRN is based are to be found in extenso in the Supplemental 
files. A sentence in Discussion notes that the “physical” GRN performed about 
the same as did a totally randomized GRN in predicting actual network linkages, 
and deep within the Supplemental data one can learn that the actual ratio of 
“enrichment,” i.e., correct predictions of the “physical” GRN of Figure 7 to those 
of the randomized GRN, is, to be exact, 1.04. Of course the basic problems are 
that binding in ChIP does not equal function, and that motif identification does 
not equal (functional) binding. But imagine the fate of an experimental molecular 
biologist who would attempt to publish the result of such an enormous effort as a 
4% improvement in predictability over random. The point this example illustrates 
is that in the world of ENCODE genomics, the analysis is to be published on the 
basis that the measurements, which fall in the approved category, were made and 
analyzed by sophisticated mathematical statistics; whether the result has any power of 
predictability is not relevant. In science, conceptual predictability accruing from an 
analysis is the golden criterion of value, of progress in understanding. Predictability 
is the lynchpin of scientific knowledge and acts as its ratchet of progress as the tests 
become more exacting, due to greater and greater available knowledge. Extrapolate 
this small example from the modENCODE report, and what we see is a rival 
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enterprise that is technologically (more-or-less) scientific, but is conceptually 
incompatible with real science. The epistemological criterion that guides science, 
predictability, is erased.
That “predictability is the lynchpin of scientific knowledge” is one of those 
metaphors, unusually for metaphors, that expands with perfect accuracy in this 
context. A dictionary definition of lynchpin is “something that holds the various 
elements of a complicated structure together,” so that when it is withdrawn the 
pieces of the structure lie about in no particular order and display no functional 
interrelationships. So when predictability is removed as the central criterion of 
scientific success, the remaining pieces, such as knowledge, relevance to the subject, 
reality, significance, conceptual import, falsifiability, all lose the roles and relations 
that constitute the scientific edifice, and they all soon disappear as well. What we are 
left with is pure observation; as in the 1950s radio/TV detective drama Dragnet, “All 
we want is the facts, ma’am, nothing but the facts.”
In responding to some of the issues raised by critics, the principals of the 
ENCODE project have produced an epistemological argument that theirs is a 
“biochemical” measure of functionality in the genome, as opposed to “genetic” 
measures or “evolutionary” measures (by which is meant reference to sequence-
dependent conservation across species; Kellis et al. 2014). This argument is doubly 
fallacious, in that these are not simply innocently alternative ways of looking at 
the world, as the article proclaims. Genetic and evolutionary criteria of functional 
significance are directly predictive, because of the mechanistic consequences of 
mutation and selective resistance to change, respectively. But even the most detailed 
biochemical measurements on normal (i.e., tissue culture) cells, like Dragnet’s “facts,” 
in themselves predict nothing unique or causal. Furthermore, not even mentioned 
is the main relevant alternative to assessing genomic functionality only by making 
an approved set of “biochemical” measurements. That alternative is determining the 
consequences of predictively conceived experimental perturbations of the control 
state. With respect to regulatory functions of the genome, this is of course how we 
know everything we know about causes in transcription molecular biology. Imagine 
trying to learn how this all works by looking only at the controls!
The Essentially Unscientific Consequences
It is interesting how odd is the configuration of the functional genome that 
emerges from this philosophical starting point. The genome is a new wonderland. All 
manner of strange and marvelous things remind us of our innocence of what is really 
out there, as if we were medieval travelers gazing at the starry universe. For example, 
deep scientific evidence has gradually allowed us to realize that proximal gene order 
is extremely flexible in animal genomes, and this feature of genomes is subject to 
continuous scrambling in evolution, within very long-range conserved syntenic 
scaffolds (Holland et al. 2008), and genes expressed together are not located together 
(Shoguchi et al. 2011). On the several gene scale, gene order cannot in general be 
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a functionally important parameter, except for those specific clusters of paralogous 
genes where the cluster is mechanistically useful, as in hox gene clusters or olfactory 
receptor gene clusters, and animal genomes operate similarly with orthologous 
genes in differing linear orders. But just as if it were a functional parameter, gene 
order can be deduced, computed, biochemically measured, described. Because the 
goal of ENCODE was “systematically mapping functional elements in the human 
genome at high resolution,” whatever is mapped must be presumed functional. 
Mysterious features emerge, for instance the colorfully named “gene deserts,” 
enormous genomic regions lacking any protein-coding genes. What is interesting is 
of course just what is not mysterious, but rather what is scientifically illuminating in 
both functional and evolutionary terms: in this case, the fascinating evidence, which 
could only have been obtained experimentally, that such “deserts” are packed with 
cis-regulatory modules which act over very long distances (Montavon et al. 2011).
The most directly contentious wonderland outcome of ENCODE epistemology 
has probably been its highly publicized assertion that 70 or 80% of the human 
genome is transcribed, which without delay was translated into the direct 
implication that scientists cannot understand what most of the genome is or does. 
These assertions were based on mapping of RNA sequence fragments against the 
genome, eschewing the use of any significance cutoff with respect to prevalence. 
To its credit, the very same recent paper reminding us of the goal of ENCODE 
also provides an extremely careful and illuminating quantitative investigation of the 
biochemical transcriptome measurements on which this remarkable transcriptional 
coverage claim is based (Kellis et al. 2014; Marinov et al. 2014). This analysis shows 
that for the major class of RNA subject to quantitative measurement, poly(A)RNA, 
almost all the transcripts that account for the unexpectedly high genome sequence 
representation are expressed at levels so extremely low as to be almost certainly 
meaningless in respect to function, at least for most transcripts. It is the sum of the 
lengths of these extremely rare transcript fragments that so shockingly exceeds the 
complexity anyone would assume to be included in pre-mRNA of the productively 
transcribed 104 or so genes that the tissue culture cells are running. As pointed out 
cogently in this same discussion, there would be a large (and unnecessary) regulatory 
cost to absolute exclusion of very low-level “noisy” “off” states. Thus, background 
presence of .01 to <1 molecules of transcript per cell for most of the sequence 
represented in the 80% transcriptome statistic should not surprise, nor does it in 
any way suggest functional meaning, rather the opposite. Knowing what we do 
of transcription and translation rates and of the required functional concentrations 
of mRNAs encoding even classes of proteins that operate at low numbers of 
molecules per cell such as transcription factors (Peter and Davidson 2015), there is 
little likelihood that these reports of very high genome representation of very low 
frequency transcripts mean anything.
The origins of the decision in ENCODE epistemology to remove as a criterion 
the lynchpin of scientific predictability are partly internal to genomics, but also 
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partly more general. This is a complex historical issue. On the internal side, 
in its nascent period, the immensely expensive and challenging task of genome 
sequencing was driven forward by technologists, engineers, computational 
innovators, and organizational geniuses, mainly not by basic bioscientists, and the 
different purview of these founders of the field has certainly continued to influence 
the intellectual atmosphere within the genomics enterprise. Externally, as often 
discussed, the practical economic and political requirements of “big science” have 
powerfully torqued the coordinates of the guidance systems operating in most parts 
of government-supported genomics. Among the force vectors most removed from 
those of basic research have been the necessity of persuading nonscientists of the 
medical and other life-changing benefits to the human condition that will accrue 
from the huge government-supported genomics enterprise. But I note these factors 
only en passant, and here I wish to look in a different direction, in order to take note 
of a more widespread intellectual movement of which the foregoing can seem only 
a subcase (though it would be more accurate to describe it as a feedback partner of 
genomics): the rise of “discovery science.”
Discovery Science
A Radical Attack on the Epistemological Backbone of Science
One reasonably representative summary of the precepts of “discovery science” 
can be found in Wikipedia:
Discovery science (also known as discovery-based science) is a scientific meth-
odology which emphasizes analysis of large volumes of experimental data with 
the goal of finding new patterns or correlations, leading to hypothesis formation 
and other scientific methodologies.
 Discovery-based methodologies are often viewed in contrast to traditional 
scientific practice, where hypotheses are formed before close examination of 
experimental data. . . .
 Data mining is the most common tool used in discovery science, and is 
applied to data from diverse fields of study such as DNA analysis, climate mod-
eling, nuclear reaction modeling, and others.
 The use of data mining in discovery science follows a general trend of in-
creasing use of computers and computational theory in all fields of science. Fur-
ther following this trend, the cutting edge of data mining employs specialized 
machine learning algorithms for automated hypothesis forming and automated 
theorem proving.
A close look at the assertions in this statement, which is quoted in its entirety 
except for one unnecessary sentence, reveals some quite curious attitudes. If it were 
not for their effect on public science policy, these attitudes would serve well as a 
cartoon illustration of belief-based decision making in public affairs.
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What “Discovery Science” Really Leads To
First, consider the opening treatment of “hypothesis formation.” In basic science, 
hypothesis formation is an inferential, inductive, creatively novel proposition of 
mechanism; hypotheses cannot be deduced, which leads to the conclusion that 
the authors of this statement have redefined “hypothesis” as deductive restatement 
of what is observed. No deductive restatement of what is observed can have 
mechanistically predictive value. Needless to say the corollary that “large volumes of 
experimental data” have the intrinsic property of “leading to hypothesis formation” 
has no meaning except after this redefinition. It is thus to be expected that here 
there is no mention of hypothesis testing by determination of the predictability 
engendered by the hypothesis, or of falsification or validation of the hypothesis. 
In other words, the object of the exercise, the “hypothesis” of this definition, has 
nothing to do with actually determining if an assertion has any reality or is just a 
deductive assertion. In fact, it has nothing to do with the real meaning of hypothesis 
in science.
Second, the definition states that in “traditional scientific practice” hypotheses 
are formed “before close examination” of the evidence, i.e., the “experimental 
data.” Perhaps this is just a commentary on the unfamiliarity of the writer of the 
Wikipedia piece with scientific history in the last century of biological research: 
from Boveri to Morgan to Crick to Britten, just to leave present company aside, no 
one knowledgeable could imagine applying to these superb scientists the description 
that they failed at “close examination of experimental data.”
Third, consider the corollary that progress in discovery science occurs by means of 
“data mining.” Since data mining usually consists of application of previously canned 
databases such as GO Ontologies or off-the-shelf statistical packages, the truth now 
emerges that discovery science can generate no discoveries. Instead it generates 
further reorganization of received observation. Thus we see under the rug: discovery 
science is in essence the same scholasticism that was so painfully overthrown by the 
stunning predictive success of inductive, hypothesis-driven experimental science in 
the last four centuries, and in biology in only the last century and a half. Had these 
tools been available to analyze texts, the machine learning and automated theorem 
proving algorithms adduced as the way to go in discovery science would have been 
avidly utilized by late medieval professorial theologians and text redactors.
But nonsense aside, even helpful considerations of how to apply large datasets 
and how to accelerate true hypothesis testing will not take us where we need to go. 
There is indeed an epistemological revolution brewing in modern bioscience. The 
experimental biology of the 20th century amply provided us with rich evidentiary 
and mechanistic foundations. Only recently, however, has it come within reach 
to conceive executable blueprints for generating rooted, predictively successful 
scientific explanations at the necessary scale, in the sense in which this essay began.
Genomics
173spring 2015 • volume 58, number 2
Systems Biology
The reason “systems biology” means all things to all users is that neither of its 
component nouns at present denotes a precise concept. In place of a definition 
that clearly excludes certain types of bioscience while clearly including others, we 
have in “systems biology” more a slogan or advertisement than a specific precept or 
premise with specific corollaries. So for present purposes I propose to generate such 
a precept, as a framework for what follows. This leans heavily on an earlier discussion 
in the recently published Handbook of Systems Biology (Peter and Davidson 2013). 
To avoid an amorphous sociological or technological excursion, the following is 
confined to a particular domain of basic research, namely, processes of developmental 
biology that are amenable to system-level experimental analysis. In this domain, the 
specific objective of research is causal explanation of the developmental process, by 
relating what happens directly to encoded genomic regulatory information. That is, 
we return to where we began this essay, scientific research the objective of which is 
genomically rooted explanation.
Basic Corollaries of a Systems Developmental Biology That Explains
The fundamental premises of experimental systems developmental biology are 
that all processes that can be defined as observable episodes of development are 
generated through multiple interactions of multiple biologically active components, 
and that all these components, and all (or almost all) their interactions, must be 
included in an analysis in order to solve a mechanism that has sufficient predictive 
explanatory power. From this basic (and uncompromising) starting point, there 
follow sufficient corollaries to define unequivocally the practice and concepts of 
systems developmental biology (corollaries are “something that follows from another 
thing,” here specific scientific conceptual relations that follow from the premises of 
system developmental biology).
Note insertion of the term experimental here. The purpose is to exclude from the 
following discussion purely computational simulations, or imaginary mathematical 
exercises that purport to represent developmental process in silico on the basis 
of a priori assumptions of mechanism (Peter and Davidson 2015). The object of 
scientific research is to arrive uniquely at an underlying explanatory mechanism, 
which object can obviously not be attained by assuming the mechanism a priori, 
whatever simulations or correlations the computation may throw up.
The first corollary of systems developmental biology is the separate proposition 
that if only a minor fraction of the components active in a process, and of their 
interactions, are encompassed in the analysis, it will be impossible to arrive at a 
solution of the mechanism. That is, except at infinity no addition of fragmentary 
unrooted explanations will ever sum to a complete rooted explanation. The basis 
of this conclusion is also the basis of the pessimistic comment above that unrooted 
research is sooner or later destined for extinction. The reason is the enormous 
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combinatorial number of degrees of freedom with which the interactive control 
systems of development can be, and evolutionarily have been, assembled.
A second corollary is that the usefulness or success or failure or validation or 
refutation of an explanation emerging from experimental systems developmental 
biology must be assessed system-wide. These tests must challenge the ability of the 
explanation to predict the behavior of the system as a whole, or the behavior of 
large sectors of it that include many individual components and their interactions.
A third corollary defines explanation and phenomenology in developmental 
biology in terms of operational scientific objectives. It states that phenomenology 
will inevitably result from research focused exclusively on a very small fraction of 
the components of a system and their interactions, and thus unrooted explanation 
inevitably produces phenomenological information. As I often commented in past 
years, 20th-century developmental biology continuously generated small islands of 
causality floating in a vast sea of phenomenology. System-wide rooted explanation 
inverts this relationship, so that when successful it gives rise to a framework of 
causality, within which are always to be found islands of not yet understood 
phenomenology.
A fourth corollary relates causality in systems developmental biology to the 
genome. Since development of the body plan is a species-specific, hardwired 
output of genomic regulatory information, and genomic information is physically 
resident in DNA sequence, explanation of a system-wide control mechanism 
for a developmental process must begin with recognition of regulatory genomic 
sequences. Hence explanation rooted in multiple elements of genomic regulatory 
sequence is what emerges from the systems biology of body plan development.
A fifth corollary states the essential roles of correctly observed phenomenology, 
and prior descriptive knowledge, in systems developmental biology. In the late 
20th century descriptive observations of developmental systems were routinely 
derided as intrinsically inferior to “problem solving.” But in the different conceptual 
coordinates of systems developmental biology, this is a dated opposition: “problem 
solving” within a tiny localized domain is a hopeless approach to system-wide 
explanation (see corollary three above). On the other hand, as in the first corollary, 
until the whole set of components and the output (behavior) of the whole 
interaction system is correctly measured/observed, it cannot be studied effectively 
by the precepts of systems developmental biology. Thus high-resolution quantitative 
and qualitative observation of transcriptional functions in time and space, and many 
other “descriptive” molecular, cell biological, and developmental aspects are of 
irreplaceable value as a starting point for a perturbation analysis, so long as they are 
system-wide.
A sixth corollary, general to all real science, states that only by deliberate 
experimental perturbation and predictive challenge of the system can the mechanisms 
by which it operates be revealed. However, applications to systems developmental 
biology produce specific complex constraints. System-level perturbations require 
Genomics
175spring 2015 • volume 58, number 2
consideration of secondary and tertiary effects because of the functional interactions 
within the system, as well as of the effects of multiple inputs at each node of the 
system. Therefore perturbation analysis in systems developmental biology demands 
the intellectual guidance provided by the use of hypothesis at every step.
The Many Other Kinds of Activity Denoted by Systems Biology
It will be more than obvious that the vast majority of what is usually denoted 
“systems biology” has not very much in common with the foregoing. Most strikingly, 
as practiced in the United States and Europe, systems biology is almost always 
applied biology, not basic research. It is not supported by small, investigator-initiated 
research grants, as is most basic bioscience. Rather, it is typically institutionalized in 
very large organizational units, both academic and .org “institutes,” supported on 
an institutional level by government funding instruments, and/or, by institutionally 
dedicated endowments and contracts. Various powerful external factors have 
contributed to this outcome. This is a proper subject for large-scale historical inquiry 
into current science funding policies in our societies, and their consequences. But 
there are also internal attributes that have irresistibly caused systems biology to drift 
in these same directions, among which are pressures for high-powered, expensive 
instrumentation and computation facilities, genuflection before very large-scale 
datasets, and the organizational constraints of large collaborative projects that involve 
a great many authors, many of whom are primarily technological contributors. 
The overall consequence is that the public trajectory of systems biology is ever 
more strongly tending toward applied science. Two self-perpetuating feedbacks have 
emerged, one economic and the other political. The evident economic feedback 
directly links the size and expense of running large institutions on the one hand, 
with the availability of enormous government and private support for targeted, 
applied research of perceived practical (and commercial) benefit on the other. A 
second kind of feedback mutually reinforces dedicated large group consortia that 
proprietarily capture targeted technological initiatives, and trendy mega-programs 
that attract political support outside of science.
Much of the mass of large-scale systems biology research is medically oriented, 
which could unexpectedly be having undesirable effects on medical research per 
se. Descriptive, large-scale correlative compilations of physiological and medical 
measurements are much in vogue for generation of diagnostic reference bases, and 
the technology required synergizes well with the predilections and capabilities 
unique to systems biology. We cannot do experiments on humans, and the type 
of high-powered correlation analysis that systems biology generates for resolving 
large-scale datasets provides an apparent substitute for experimental extraction of 
causal relations. Thus we see claims that computational inference from analyses of 
unperturbed human cell types of medical significance can reveal their underlying 
gene regulatory networks (Novershtern et al. 2011). In essence, though increasingly 
sophisticated (and increasingly large and expensive), such efforts are philosophically 
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akin to “discovery science,” here powered by systems biology methodologies that 
operate under the constraints of direct medical relevance.
For fundamental science, however, all this is very, very far from the beneficial 
epistemological significance, and the real importance, of the precepts of systems 
biology. These precepts amount to a potential revolution in the conduct of basic 
science. In my field, systems developmental biology, the revolution is no longer 
potential. It is here.
Causal Systems Biology That Works
Proof of Principle: The Long Road to Causal, Predictive,  
System-Level Explanation in Development
About the year 2000, my lab embarked on a journey never before taken except 
in imagination. Its objective was to discover and solve, and then try to understand as 
a system, the encoded genomic regulatory instructions directing a whole large phase 
of embryonic development. Unlike the transoceanic explorers of the 15th century, 
we had an approximately realistic idea of what had to lie on the other side if we 
could get there, but just as it was for those explorers, our means of getting there was 
incredibly primitive from the vantage point of current times (Wey-Gomez 2008). 
Theory initially formulated on almost purely logical grounds over 30 years earlier 
told us that what had to be on the other side would be encoded gene regulatory 
networks (GRNs, as now generally termed), physically resident in large sets of DNA 
sequences of regulatory function that could be uniquely recognized by sequence-
specific gene regulatory macromolecules (Britten and Davidson 1969). The 
predicted control system had to have the form of a network, because there was no 
escape from the deduction that each regulatory macromolecule must control many 
target genes, but on the other hand each gene encoding regulatory macromolecules 
must also integrate multiple inputs combinatorially in order for novel regulatory 
functions to be established in development: hence, the configuration of a network. 
We thought in 1969 that the regulatory macromolecules would likely be RNAs, 
but two years later we realized the logic would be the same if they were proteins, as 
turned out mainly to be the case (Britten and Davidson 1971).
Gene Regulatory Networks
To fast forward, GRNs are now recognized as the canonical control apparatus 
of developing animal systems. They consist of genes encoding transcription factors 
and signaling ligands and receptors, plus the DNA regulatory sequences that control 
expression of these very genes in response to binding of transcription factors at 
their regulatory sequences. As so long ago inferred, genomic control systems are 
indeed networks, because of their combinatorial inputs at each regulatory gene and 
combinatorial outputs with respect to target genes. The function of GRNs is to 
generate sets of cellular “regulatory states,” i.e., where “regulatory states” specifically 
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denote the sum total of active transcription factors that in each cell at each time 
in development determine specifically what genes will be expressed. Therefore 
GRNs determine what functions the cells can and will execute. Regulatory states 
are expressed dynamically in the embryonic space of the organism, determining its 
regional functional morphology, thus its development. The single most important 
attribute of GRNs is that they are hardwired into the hereditary genomic sequence 
that defines each species, and changes in this sequence define the evolutionary 
history of each species. GRNs are at the heart of the matter: they are the encoded 
devices that have the function of transforming the unchanging linear DNA sequence 
code into the regulatory molecular biology that ends up organizing development. 
Thus, about 15 years ago when we jumped off on this expedition, we knew that 
solving a developmental GRN, which had never been accomplished except at a toy 
level or in the imaginary world, would be an objective of enormous significance; 
but how to get an experimental grip on the control system for making an organism 
was anything but transparent.
Decades of experience had proved sea urchin embryos the most accessible to 
straight molecular biological regulatory analyses of any experimental embryonic 
system, and once again they did not disappoint. By about three years ago, we had 
pretty much in hand an experimentally established GRN controlling development 
of about half the embryo (its mesoderm and endoderm) up to gastrulation, including 
the interactions among about 50 regulatory genes over a 30-hour period (Davidson 
et al. 2002; Oliveri, Tu, and Davidson 2008; Peter and Davidson 2009, 2010, 2011; 
Peter, Faure, and Davidson 2012). We invented GRN theory as we went, and have 
recently formalized this whole area of systems developmental biology from our own 
and others’ work (Peter and Davidson 2015). We also had to create the technology 
and algorithms needed for perturbation and regulatory state analyses on the scale 
required. The six corollaries above that for us underlie systems developmental 
biology, hammered out in this journey of discovery, now serve as canonical guides, 
as GRN analysis extends to more and more of the embryo, and more stages, and 
more embryonic systems.
How We Know It Works
There is no resting upon laurels in living science, and I end this essay with a 
brief retrospective on the outcome of the huge epistemological challenge with 
which experimental solution of the sea urchin embryo endomesoderm GRN then 
confronted us. For though we had gone to all lengths to build as complete a GRN as 
evidence warranted or suggested, that is scarcely a test of sufficiency of explanation. 
Therefore we determined to transform the GRN into a computational engine that 
according to the GRN structure would generate predictions of when and where 
in the embryonic endomesoderm every regulatory gene should be expressed or 
not expressed. Then we could compare these computational predictions to direct 
experimental observation: the comparison would show whether the GRN indeed 
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suffices to explain the spatial and temporal patterns of gene expression, or how 
much of these patterns the GRN explains. This is not the place to review in any 
detail the ways and means by which the necessary computational model was built, 
as this has been discussed amply in the literature (Faure, Peter, and Davidson 2013; 
Peter and Davidson 2015; Peter, Faure, and Davidson 2012). In a few words, we 
used the input/output results that in the solved GRN indicate what regulatory gene 
products are required for spatial and temporal expression of every regulatory gene 
included, and based on these requirements we built logic equations for each gene. 
These statements captured all we knew of the conditions upon which the encoded 
regulatory apparatus of each gene would generate expression or silence (in the case 
of repression). The expression state of each gene was computed every hour in in 
silico time, and expressed as a boolean 1 or 0, which could be directly compared 
with observation, as in parallel, the real world observed by in situ hybridization and 
quantitative transcript measurements showed genes to have “on” or “off” expression 
states in each region of the embryo.
The overall result is shown in Figure 1, reproduced from this work (Peter, Faure, 
and Davidson 2012): here the regulatory genes appear along the top; the four colors 
represent four spatial/developmental fate domains of the embryo; and time proceeds 
in one hour intervals within each. The green bars under certain genes denote the 
maternally encoded roles of these gene products in setting the initial regulatory 
conditions. Where there is a grey cell, the computation and the observation agree 
the gene should be off in that time/space cell. Where there is a solid color cell, the 
computation and the observation agree the gene should be on in that time/space 
cell. Where there is a black symbol there is a discrepancy between what the GRN 
predicts and what is observed. As the figure shows, there are >2770 time/space 
cells, and the GRN successfully predicted the activity state in all but a tiny fraction 
of these cells. (The occasional open black symbols indicate possible discrepancies, 
which however are only temporal and are less than the resolution of the observations, 
so they can be ignored.) There were a few places where genes are observed to turn 
off (striped boxes), for which the GRN provided no explanation, and a few real 
temporal discrepancies, but no spatial discrepancies throughout.
What We Can Conclude
Major conclusions follow: First, this result provides proof of principle that 
systems developmental biology can generate a (nearly) compete causal explanation 
of observed gene expression patterns. Second, that proof of principle explicitly 
refers to explanation rooted in genomic regulatory sequence function, which is 
therefore where the causal program for development resides. Third, there is room 
for no other levels of explanation than what is encoded in the regulatory DNA of 
the regulatory genes of this system; i.e., other aspects of gene expression machinery 
(e.g., epigenetic) operate downstream of the DNA sequence recognition system. 
Fourth, the computational system runs as an automaton, in that it utilizes at each 
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Figure 1
Computational test of GRN sufficiency (Peter, Faure, and Davidson 2012). Computation of hourly 
spatial expression versus data: out of 2,772 space/time expression domains, there are very few 
significant discrepancies.
Eric H. Davidson Genomics
180 Perspectives in Biology and Medicine
interval the output at the previous interval, and once initiated operates progressively 
with no added external inputs. This is of course how development works in life, 
and also how computers work. It is worth a moment’s reflection that the only 
configuration that could display the properties of an automaton is a network of 
regulatory genes: the requirement for an automaton is that the outputs of elements 
of the system (transcription factors) are also the inputs to the elements of the system.
So in sum, this most fundamental functional output of the animal genome, 
development, can indeed be experimentally accessed and solved at a system-wide 
causal level. This is new, and indeed it constitutes a revolutionary change in our 
ability to generate comprehensive scientific knowledge. But what is not new, and 
what still lies uniquely at the heart of real science, including basic science done at 
the system level, is the inductive use of predictive hypothesis.
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